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Is The Quest for Corporate Responsibility a Wild Goose Chase? The
Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗

Abstract
Peter Lovenheim owned a small stake in Iroquois Brands, Ltd (Iroquois). He
proposed that the corporation discontinue its distribution of one product, pâté de foie
gras, because he objected to the treatment of the geese necessary to the production of
the product. Under federal regulations, Iroquois was required to include such
proposals in the proxy materials it sent out in advance of its annual shareholder
meeting unless an exception applied. Iroquois Brands thought it could exclude the
proposal because the product in question constituted a trivial part of its business.
Lovenheim went to the District Court seeking an order requiring Iroquois Brands to
distribute his proposal, and the District Court granted Lovenheim the relief he sought.
In teaching the case in my Business Associations course, I have often wondered
how Peter Lovenheim came to make his proposal and whether such whether such
proposals relating to social or ethical issues (social proposals) are a proper use of the
shareholder proposal mechanism. The District Court recognized an extremely broad
right of shareholders to bring social proposals. The decision to do so makes more
sense when the case is situated in its various historical contexts, including the history of
the governing regulations and the case law that informed the District Court’s opinion.
The story of Lovenheim contains its share of surprises. First, Lovenheim was,
in many ways, the ideal shareholder proponent. He bought Iroquois stock as an
investment, but he also had certain ideas about the nature of the company. He believed
in the company, and he did not think that distributing pâté de foie gras was consistent
with his idea of the company. He was confident that other shareholders would feel the
same way. Second, although Lovenheim’s proposal ultimately did not succeed with
Iroquois’ shareholders, the company did discontinue the product. Lovenheim thus
considered his proposal a success, and for several years after the case was decided, he
∗

Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. The Author is grateful to Peter Lovenheim and
Ralph Halpern, for their willingness to help me reconstruct the background to this case, and also to my
colleague, Rebecca Huss, who helped me to situate the case in two of its important contexts, the history
of animal law and the corporate response to shareholder proposals.
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teamed up with like-minded people to use the shareholder proposal mechanism to
pressure corporations to adopt policies promoting the humane treatment of animals.
The story of Lovenheim thus illustrates the extra-legal consequences of shareholder
activism.
After a history of the relevant SEC regulations and their fates in the courts, the
Article presents the complete narrative of the Lovenheim case, providing details that
are not captured in the decision or in the limited secondary literature relating to the
case. It explains the legal landscape and why the Lovenheim case was such a
groundbreaking case. In the final section, the Article explains why the case has
remained good law in the 25 years since it was decided and why corporations are not
motivated to pressure the SEC to limit shareholders’ rights to bring social proposals.
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INTRODUCTION
In Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,1 plaintiff Peter Loveneheim asked the
D.C. District Court to enjoin defendant Iroquois Brands, Ltd. (Iroquois) from omitting a
shareholder proposal from the proxy materials sent out in advance of its 1985 annual
shareholder meeting.2 The proposal related to a French product, pâté de foie gras,
which Iroquois distributed in the United States,3 and which constituted a tiny part of
Iroquois’ business.4 Lovenheim, the owner of two hundred shareds of Iroquois’
common stock,5 called upon Iroquois to investigate whether the French producer
engaged in forced-feeding of the geese, which Lovenheim considered a form of animal
cruelty, in producing the pâté de foie gras and, if that turned out to be the case, asked
Iroquois to consider discontinuing the product until a more humane means of
production could be developed.6 He decided to submit a shareholder proposal as
permitted under SEC rule 14a-8 (the Rule)7 promulgated pursuant to Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act).8 Those regulations provide that a
corporation must include qualifying shareholder proposals in its proxy solicitation
materials distributed in advance of annual or special shareholder meetings, along with
the shareholder’s statement in support of the proposal.9 A shareholder proposal is any
“recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take
action” that a shareholder intends to present at a shareholder meeting.10 The District

1

618 F.Supp. 554 (D.C. Dist. 1985).

2

Id. at 556.

3

Id.

4

See id. at 559 (finding that sales of the product accounted for none of Iroquois net earnings and less
than 0.05 percent of its assets).
5

Id. at 556.

6

Id.

7

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.

8

48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2009)).

9

Id. At the time, the proposal, together with the statement in support, must be no more than 200
words in length. Lovenheim, 618 F.Supp. at 557 n .4. The current version of the rule allows
shareholders 500 words to support their proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2009).
10

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a).
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Court granted Lovenheim’s motion and preliminarily enjoined Iroquois from sending
out its proxy materials without the proposal.11
Lovenheim is not only a standard teaching case in corporate law courses, it is
routinely cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to
corporations seeking to exclude shareholder proposals from proxy materials on the
ground that the proposals are not significantly related to the corporations’ businesses.12
Despite the case’s prominence, its story has not been told in detail. That is a shame,
because the details of the case are as surprising as its outcome must have been to
Iroquois when the court granted Lovenheim the injunction he sought.
The case seems like a set-up. At the time he invested in Iroquois, Lovenheim
was the Government Relations Counsel for the Humane Society of the United States
(Humane Society) in Washington, D.C.13 Lovenheim had offered the same proposal at
the 1983 shareholder meeting, at which time only about 5% of the voting shares
supported it.14 During oral argument, Lovenheim’s counsel conceded that Lovenheim
had no expectation that the proposal would succeed.15 Lovenheim himself seems to be
a front for the Humane Society, and his suit appears to be a political crusade
masquerading as shareholder activism.16 That is, it seems like Lovenheim was in fact
far more interested in stopping animal cruelty than he was in preserving the value of his
investment in Iroquois stock. After all, his proposal could not have succeeded. Had it
succeeded it only would have required the corporation to form a committee to
investigate the process whereby one of its products was produced. Lovenheim likely
knew that no such investigation was necessary, since as far as he knew, pâté de foie gras
11

Lovenheim, 618 F.Supp. at 562

12

A Westlaw search reveals that the case has been cited in five published cases and nearly 150 SEC
No-Action Letters.
13

Joyce Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972-1987), 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 3,
40 (2008).
14

Memorandum of Law, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of
Corporation Finance appealing the Division’s decision regarding the Lovenheim Shareholder Proposal for
Iroquois Brands, Ltd., Commission File No. 1-5387, at 2-3 (Jan 30, 1984) (on file with the author).
15

See Transcript, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,
Civ. Action No. 85-0734, at 5 (D.C. Ct. Mar 19, 1985) (on file with the author) (statement of
Lovenheim’s counsel: “I will be the first to admit that in the 43 years of the shareholder proposal rule
only two shareholder proposals have ever been passed, and they basically had management support.”).
16

One scholar claimed that Lovenheim’s petition had achieved “legendary status” as an example of
the extent to which social issue proposals had become “trivial and nonsensical.” Marilyn B. Cane, The
Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System: Attitudes, Results and Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57,
61 (1985).
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was always produced through the brutal force-feeding of geese.17 And so the entire
shareholder proposal process, even if successful, would have resulted in a report which
would have confirmed what the shareholders already knew when they overwhelmingly
rejected the same proposal in 1983.
This Article is a Law Story.18 Law Stories have many purposes, but their main goal
is to supplement and demystify the case method of legal pedagogy.19 The case method
has been criticized for presenting students with the law more or less as a fait accompli.
The case method assumes a pre-existing body of law that students passively learn rather
than learning to think of the law as something that they will have a hand in shaping.20
By placing the (mostly appellate) opinions that law students read in their various
historical contexts, Law Stories transport students back to a point where the law was
uncertain and thus enable them to better imagine alternatives to existing legal rules and
to appreciate the reasoning underling those rules.
Both Peter Lovenheim and Lovenheim, as well as the dynamic of shareholder
proposals, turn out to be far more complicated than the opinion would lead one to
expect, and that is why the case provides the basis for an especially rich Law Story.
First, although Peter Lovenheim looks, when we are first introduced to him, like a
typical shareholder activist, who was much more interested in pushing a social agenda
than in promoting good corporate governance, he is actually more like the ideal
shareholder proponent: he invested in Iroquois to make a profit, and he submitted his
proposal because he sincerely believed that the distribution of pâté de foie gras was
inconsistent with Iroquois’ corporate purposes and thus would do harm to the
corporation’s reputation and thus to its good-will value.
17

See id. at 7-8 (statement of Lovenheim’s counsel acknowledging that force-feeding is the only way
pâté de foie gras is produced).
18

Many Law Stories are collected in Foundation Press’s LAW STORIES series. A complete listing of
the books in the series is provided on Foundation Press’s website:
http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductSearchResults.aspx?tab=6&series=177&searchtypeasst
ring=ADVANCED-SEARCH.
19

See Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future: Teaching Law through Law Stories, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
405, 406 (2002) (making the “modest claim” that Law Stories can enrich classroom teaching through the
case method). In 2005, the Journal of Legal Education recognized the importance of the Law Stories
approach by devoting a section of one of its issues to “Teaching Law Stories.” Leslie, Bender, Teaching
Torts Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 108 (2005); Ajay K. Mehorata, Teaching Tax Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 116
(2005); Thomas Ross, Teaching Constitutional Law Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 126 (2005); Nancy S. Marder,
Teaching Civil Procedure Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 138 (2005); Laura S. Underkuffler, Teaching Property
Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 152 (2005).
20

Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609,
649 (2007); see also Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEG. ED. 211, 212 (1948)
(faulting the case method for providing solutions to the problems posed in advance and thus not
encouraging students to develop their own powers of reasoning and problem-solving).
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Second, although Lovenheim’s proposal did not get very many votes from his
fellow shareholders, he regarded the exercise as a success because soon after the
shareholder vote, Iroquois decided to discontinue distribution of pâté de foie gras. His
success – or what he regarded as success – led Lovenheim to pursue other social goals
through the shareholder proposal mechanism. His experience as a proponent led him to
work with other like-minded shareholders on issues relevant to the corporations whose
shares they owned. The shareholder proposal mechanism thus stimulates shareholder
involvement in corporate governance. The story behind Lovenheim thus illustrates the
numerous legal and non-legal consequences of a legal rule.
In Part I, this Article explores the law of shareholder proposals and the reasons
why the SEC and the courts permit proposals relating to social or ethical issues (social
proposals) so long as those issues relate to the corporation’s business. The focus here is
on the regulation of such social proposals. Other regulations permitting the exclusion of
shareholder proposals will be discussed only to the extent that they interact with the rule
relating to social proposals. Part II presents the complete narrative of the Lovenheim
case, providing details that are not captured in the decision or in the limited secondary
literature relating to the case. Part III explores the legal landscape in the aftermath of
Lovenheim. The decision may well have been a surprising one, and this final section
explores the reasons why the decision remains the leading case on social proposals.
As discussed in Part III of the Article, opinions on the value of social proposals
hinge on opinions on the purposes of corporations and the roles of shareholders in the
corporations in which they own shares. Corporations seem to recognize the value of
permitting social proposals, as they can provide a relatively inexpensive safety valve for
dissent21 and thus permit the kind of beneficial exchange between management and
shareholders that promotes the legitimacy of the corporate decision-making processes.
While corporations might regard these benefits as slight, the expense of social proposals
is also very small. Corporations thus have little reason to appear to be attempting to
obstruct one avenue of meaningful dialogue between management and shareholders
when the traffic along that avenue relieves stress from the system and thus helps
guarantee that the main arteries of commerce will not be blocked.

I.

HISTORY OF SEC IMPLEMENTATION OF § 14(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

One might reasonably ask why we permit shareholder proposals in the first
place. After all, it is a fundamental premise of corporate governance that managers

21

Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65
GEO. L. J. 635, 635 (1977); Melvin Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1494 (1970).
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manage.22 Shareholders may be the beneficial owners of the corporation, but the
separation of ownership and control is one of the key advantages of the corporate
form.23 Although shareholder activism has always been one of the ingredients of U.S.
corporate governance,24 Congress had acted in the early twentieth century to limit the
ability of financial institutions to participate in corporate affairs.25 However, in
response to its perception that corporate management was abusing the proxy solicitation
process,26 Congress granted the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) broad
power to regulate proxy solicitations in Section 14(a) of the ’34 Act,27 and the current
22

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ); Paramount
Communications v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (DE 1994) (“Under normal circumstances,
neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the managerial decisions of the directors.”);
Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F.Supp. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing general corporate principles
granting broad discretion to corporate management in permitting Standard Oil to exclude a shareholder
proposal related to fostering the development of petroleum reserves and working to create an
international regime to manage the exploitation of mineral resources).
23

JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that centralized
administration is a necessity in a large corporation and that shareholders as such do not participate in the
day-to-day management of the corporations); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301, 302 (1983) (arguing that “separation of decision and riskbearing functions survives . . . in part because of the benefits of specialization of management and risk
bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling the agency problems cause by
separation of decision and risk-bearing functions”).
24

See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States,
19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007) (noting role of financial institutions as shareholder activists in the
early 20th century).
25

See id. (citing the Glass Steagall Act as well as regulatory reforms that followed the 1929 stock
market crash, which had the cumulative effect of widening the gap between ownership & control in U.S.
public corporations).
26

See Schwartz & Weiss, Assessment of the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L. J. at 636
(claiming that, prior to 1934, management was soliciting proxies without informing shareholders of the
matters to be considered at the annual shareholder meeting and then using the favorable proxies thus
obtained to control the meeting and for other questionable purposes).
27

Section 14(a) of the 34 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered pursuant to [Section 12 of the ’34 Act].

48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)).
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form of shareholder activism is a product of an SEC rule first introduced in 1942,28 the
predecessor to the current Rule.29 The Rule requires management to include in its
proxy materials sent out in advance of annual shareholder meetings shareholder
proposals to be voted on at those meetings so long as the shareholder meets certain
conditions to qualify as a proponent.30
Since Section 14(a) simply prohibits deceptive practices in the solicitation of
proxies, it is not obvious that the Rule implements the congressional legislation.31 The
SEC interpreted Section 14(a) as insuring fair corporate suffrage and “shareholders who
were enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation but also as to
the major questions of policy, which are decided at shareholder meetings.”32 In order to
ensure that proxy materials accurately reflected all issues that would arise at an annual
meeting, the SEC interpreted its own rules to permit shareholders to present proposals at
annual meetings.33 As one court put it, “[C]orporate circulation of proxy materials
which fail to make reference to a shareholder’s intention to present a proper proposal at
the annual meeting renders the solicitation inherently misleading.”34 Others have
pointed out that these rules were necessary in any case to safeguard the rights of
shareholders recognized under state law.35

28

The Rule was first designated Rule X-14A-7. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347
(Dec. 18, 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 10,655.
29

Gillan & Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. at 55.

30

In its current version, the Rule requires that shareholders hold a minimum of $2,000 worth of
shares in the corporation or more than 1% of the corporation’s outstanding shares and hold those shares
for a minimum of one year prior to making the proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2009).
31

See George W. Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 12
(1985) (noting that neither the text nor the legislative history of Section 14(a) mentions shareholder
proposals); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV.
425, 465-66 (1984) (arguing that the Rule is hardly likely to achieve congressional intent to assure fair
corporate suffrage).
32

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 821 F.Supp. 877, 882
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
33

Id.

34

New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. American Brands, Inc. 634 F.Supp. 1382, 1386
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
35

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 211(b) (mandating an annual shareholder meeting at which
“any proper business may be transacted”); see also Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical
Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L. J. 549, 549 (1957) (calling fundamental
aspects of Rule 14a-8 “an almost necessary consequence of the status of the individual shareholder under
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A. Implementation of the Rule 1942-1970
In enacting Section 14 of the ‘34 Act, Congress responded to an unpleasant byproduct of the separation of ownership and control in the structure of corporations.
“[A]s management became divorced from ownership and came under the control of
banking groups, men forgot that they were dealing with the savings of men and the
making of profits became an impersonal thing.”36 Congress chose to regulate corporate
proxies as one mechanism for preventing management from circumventing “fair
corporate suffrage.”37
1. Overview of SEC Regulation of Social Proposals
The SEC’s initial regulatory efforts in this area were directed at promoting “full
and fair disclosure” in corporate proxy materials.38 In 1942, the SEC took the logical
next step by adopting a rule that required management to include in its proxy materials
shareholder proposals that constituted a “proper subject for action by security
holders.”39 This seemed to offer shareholders an extensive right to provide their input
to management, but the SEC immediately saw the danger that shareholders would use
the proposal mechanism to raise matters that bore little relationship to company’s
affairs. In 1945, the Commission issued a release opining that “proposals which deal
with general political social or economic matters” are not proper subjects for
shareholder action.40
Between 1943 and 1970, shareholders submitted proposals on a variety of
issues, but the main focus of shareholder activism in the years between World War II
and the Viet Nam War was corporate governance.41 Shareholders sought accountability
from boards and management and improved performance that would increase the value
the laws of the various states of incorporation”). Freeman served in the SEC’s General Counsel Office
from 1934-42 and as its Assistant Solicitor from 1942-46. Id. at 549, n.*.
36

Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (quoting
H.R.Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1934)).
37

Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 676 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, 13 (1934)).
38

Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 677 (citing 3 Fed. Reg. 1991 (1938); 5 Fed. Reg. 174 (1940)).

39

Rule X-14-7, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,659 (1942).

40

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638 (Jan. 3, 1945).

41

See Gillan and Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FINANCE at 56
(finding that, as late as 1978, 611 of 790 proposals received by member companies of the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries dealt with governance issues).
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of their shares.42 There arose in the 1940s the phenomenon of the “gadfly investor.”
Three such investors, Lewis and John Gilbert43 and Evelyn Davis still accounted for 30
percent of the resolutions submitted to corporations as late as 1982.44 Their prominence
among proponents led to cries that the process was being abused by people who were
not interested in the economic well-being of the corporation but by people interested in
promoting “crackpot” ideas or “afflicted with insatiate desire for personal publicity.”45
The SEC’s approach to shareholder proposals has tended to mirror the times. As
one commentator put it, in the 1950s, the SEC “added layers of conditions to the rule
and gutted meaningful shareholder access.”46 The SEC relaxed its restrictions during
the Viet Nam and Watergate eras before again seeking to “squelch access” during the
more conservative 1980s.47 In 1984, the SEC granted no-action letters to 78% of the
corporations that requested them.48 The trend towards a restrictive reading of
shareholder rights continued into the next decade. By the mid 90s, the SEC was 30
percent more likely to permit the exclusion of proposals relating to corporations’ social
responsibilities than it had been in the 80s.49
2. The Rule in the Courts
The first significant court case testing shareholders’ ability to challenge
management on issues of corporate governance through the mechanism of the

42

Id. (characterizing the first three decades of shareholder proposals as “aimed at improving
performance and raising share values”).
43

Lewis Gilbert had been called the “most celebrated minority shareholder.” LOUIS LOSS, 2
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 903, n.182 (2d ed. 1961). His main concerns were undeclared dividends and
the installation of accounting and monitoring devices to improve directors’ accountability to shareholders.
Ryan, Rule 14a-8, 23 GA. L. REV. at 117, n.77. He and his brother accounted for nearly half the
shareholder proposals offered from 1948-1951 and for nearly 2/3 of the proposals offered in 1955. Alan
R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV.
879, 897, n.74 (1994).
44

Gillan and Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FINANCE at 56.

45

See Arthur D. Chilgren, A Plea for Relief from Proxy Rule 14a-8, 19 BUS. LAW. 303, 303-04
(1963) (finding it inconceivable that the majority of shareholder proposals “result from stock purchases
made with any serious investment intent”).
46

Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 879-880.

47

Id. at 880.

48

Cane, Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System, 11 J. CORP. L. at 60.

49

Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 882, 913.
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shareholder proposal came in SEC v. Transamerica Corp.50 The main issue in the case
was the scope of the “proper subject” for shareholder action referenced in the Rule.
Transamerica argued that shareholder proposals must relate to a subject matter on which
shareholders were permitted to vote under all legal requirements, including those found
in the corporation’s charter and by-laws.51 The SEC took the broader position
permitting proposals on any subject matter in which a shareholder had an interest under
state law.52
The court sided with the SEC, stressing that Transamerica’s reading of the Rule
would circumvent Congress’s intent “to require fair opportunity for the operation of
corporate suffrage.”53 Because a corporation must be run for the benefit of its
stockholders and not for that of its managers,54 management could not be permitted to
place technical provisions of a corporation’s charter or by-laws beyond the reach of the
shareholder vote. “The control of great corporations by a very few persons was the
abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section 14(a).”55
Although it supported shareholder rights in the Transamerica case, between
1948 and 1954, the SEC repeatedly revised the Rule to limit the ability of shareholders
to make proposals. In 1948, the SEC permitted corporations to exclude from their
proxy statements proposals relating to personal grievances and proposals submitted by
shareholders who did not attend the annual meeting, either in person or by proxy.56 In
1952, the SEC made a further attempt to prevent shareholder proposals from becoming
a forum for the airing of political grievances, permitting corporate managers to exclude
proposals submitted “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic,
political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”57 The propriety of this regulation
was not tested for nearly two decades.58 The SEC again expanded the permissible
grounds for exclusion in 1954, permitting corporate management to exclude proposals
50

163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947).

51

Id. at 515.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 518

54

Id. at 517.

55

Id.

56

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4185 (Nov. 12, 1948), 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679 (1948).

57

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4475 (Dec. 11, 1952), 13 Fed. Reg. 11,430 (1952).

58

See Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 678 (“So far as we have been able to determine, the
Commission’s interpretation or application of this rule has not been considered by the courts.”).
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relating to “ordinary business operations,” proposals that would violate state law and
resubmitted proposals that had recently been overwhelmingly rejected.59
Like these SEC revisions to the Rule, the case law in the two decades following
the Transamerica decision was decidedly favorable to the discretion of both corporate
management and the SEC, both of which inclined towards excluding proposals,
especially social proposals. For example, in Peck v. Greyhound Corp.,60 shareholder
Peck brought a proposal calling on the corporation to abolish its segregated seating
system in the South.61 Greyhound sought to exclude the proposal and relied on the
1945 SEC release cited earlier,62 stating that it was not the intent of the Rule “to permit
stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders with respect to matters that
are of a general political, social or economic nature.”63 The SEC staff agreed with the
corporation’s assessment of the propriety of the proposal, finding that it was not on a
“proper subject.”64 The Peck court did not go so far as to endorse Greyhound’s
interpretation of the 1945 SEC Release. However, it denied Peck’s motion to enjoin
Greyhound from soliciting proxies and holding its shareholder meeting unless Peck’s
proposal were included in Greyhound’s proxy materials, finding that that Peck had
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.65 The court believed that Peck must
first pursue SEC review of its staff’s no-action letter before seeking the injunction.66 In
addition, the court noted that considerable deference was due to the SEC’s
interpretation of its own rules and also found that Peck could not establish that he would
be irreparably harmed if his injunction were denied.67
The trend towards deference to SEC decisions continued in Dyer v. SEC,68
which raised the same kinds of corporate governance issues that the Third Circuit had
59

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4979 (Jan. 1, 1954), 19 Fed. Reg. 246 (1954).

60

97 F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

61

Id. at 680.

62

See supra, note 39.

63

Peck, 97 F.Supp. at 680 (citing Release No. 3638 (Jan. 3 1945)).

64

Id. at 680.

65

Id. at 680-81.

66

Id. at 681.

67

Id. The proposal may have been excludable in any case because it would have put the company in
violation of state laws then assumed to be valid. Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 678.
68

289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1961).
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found a proper subject for shareholder proposals in Transamerica. In Dyer, plaintiffs
sought to force management of the Union Electric Company to include in its proxy
materials 11 resolutions, by-law amendments and amendments to the articles of
incorporation.69 Some of the proposals had been the subject of a previous suit, others
had been submitted and overwhelmingly rejected by shareholders in recent shareholder
meetings.70 The Dyer court recognized the Transamerica decision as one with which it
needed to come to terms. However, it found the two cases easily distinguishable. In
Transamerica, the SEC had supported inclusion of the proposals, and doing so was in
accordance with Delaware law.71 In Dyer, by contrast, the SEC supported the
corporation’s decision to exclude the proposals. In addition, the court characterized as
“almost fanciful” petitioners’ argument that the SEC was without rational basis to
exclude their proposals, which were inconsistent with Missouri law, when management
had agreed to the inclusion of a substantively similar proposal that was properly
submitted under Missouri law.72
While there seems little doubt that the Dyer court reached the right conclusions
with respect to the proposals at issue in that case, the opinion is significant in the
deferential language it adopted with respect to determinations of the SEC staff.73 The
court took the lack of case law challenging SEC determinations on shareholder
proposals as evidence that courts and shareholders alike were willing to accept such
determinations as within the province of the SEC.74
Deference to management and the SEC characterized decisions in this area into
the late 60s, when the courts dealt another blow to shareholder activism in Brooks v.
Standard Oil Co.75 In that case, plaintiff offered a resolution that called on Standard Oil
to intensify its efforts to encourage exploration of the world’s continental shelves for oil
69

Id. at 243.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 246.

72

Id.

73

See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to
Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS. L. REV. 33, 50 (1997) (finding
a deferential posture in the court’s reference to a “lack of reported decisions” relating to shareholder
proposals as evidencing general acceptance of the SEC’s regulatory judgments in the area).
74

See Dyer, 289 F.2d at 245 (“Presumably, from the lack of reported decisions, the denials of
attempts by stockholders in other public holding company situations to have inclusions made in
management’s proxy material must generally have had their end in an acceptance of the regulatory
judgment which the Commission has exercised in the particular situation.”).
75

308 F.Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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reserves and to encourage the creation of an international regime over undersea mineral
resources.76 Standard Oil notified the SEC that it intended to exclude the proposal,
asserting that the proposal could be omitted because it: (1) was not on a proper subject
for shareholder action; (2) related to ordinary business matters; and (3) primarily sought
to promote a general economic or political cause.77 Plaintiff, an attorney with expertise
in the utilization of underwater mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction,78 sought
a declaratory judgment that his resolution was on a proper subject for action by
shareholders.79
The SEC issued Standard Oil a no-action letter on the ground that the proposal
was not a proper subject for action by shareholders.80 In so doing, the SEC clearly
violated its own rules.81 The Rule required that, if the corporation claimed a legal
ground for the omission of a shareholder proposal, the corporation must include a
“supporting opinion of counsel” with its notice of intention to omit.82 Since Standard
Oil provided no such opinion of counsel, it could not possibly have met its burden of
production.83 However, the court concluded that plaintiff was not harmed by the SEC’s
failure to adhere to its own procedural requirements, as Standard Oil’s opinion of
counsel would have relied on the same legal arguments as Standard Oil presented in the
court case.84 Moreover, citing an earlier ruling in the Dyer litigation, the court adopted
a highly deferential approach to review of SEC no-action letters, accepting the SEC’s
judgment “unless it can be said that what has been done is without any rational basis on
all the elements involved.”85

76

Id. at 811.

77

Id. at 812 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1), (2) and (5)).

78

Id. at 811

79

Id. at 810.

80

Brooks, 308 F.Supp at 812.

81

Id. at 813 (citing Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. 4979 (1954)).

82

Id. at 811, n.2 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)).

83

Id. at 811, n.2.

84

Id.
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Id. at 813 (citing Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1959)). The court also relied on Peck to
support its deference to the SEC’s construction of its own rules. Id. at 813 (citing Peck v. Greyhound
Corp., 97 F.Supp 679, 681 S.D.N.Y. 1951)).
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The only issue for the court to resolve then was whether the SEC had correctly
construed New Jersey law relating to the relative powers of corporate management and
shareholders. The parties agreed that there was no New Jersey authority for whether or
not plaintiff’s proposal was a proper subject for shareholder action.86 However, the
court cited both New Jersey law and the Standard Oil by-laws, which both provided in
nearly identical language that “the business and affairs of [the] corporation shall be
managed by its board.”87 The court further relied on case law to extend something like
the business judgment rule88 to the shareholder proposal context as well. The court
cited two opinions of New Jersey’s Chancery Court, one from 1891 and one from 1942.
The first stated that “[q]uestions of policy of management . . . are left solely to the
honest decision of the directors if their powers are without limitation and free from
restraint.”89 In the later case, the Chancery Court noted the “well-settled rule of law
that questions of business policy devolve upon the officers and directors. . . .”90 The
court noted that most of the proposals that had been approved concerned matters
relating to the selection, retention, and accountability of officers and directors91 and
appeared to treat that fact as evidence that corporations were only required to include
such proposals in their proxy materials.
Thus, three decades after the SEC first adopted the Rule, the scope of the right
of shareholders to bring proposals at annual meetings was narrowly circumscribed in
two ways. First, the SEC was granting no-action letters with respect to all proposals
except those relating to selection, compensation and accountability of managers.
Second, the courts had adopted a highly deferential approach to SEC decisions, even if

86

Brooks, 308 F.Supp at 814.

87

Id. at 814.

88

The Delaware Supreme Court defines the business judgment rule as “a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of
discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) (citations omitted). See D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure and
Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 833-838 (2007) (noting that the business judgment rule
has been variously understood as a presumption, a heightened standard of review and a doctrine of
judicial abstention).
89

Id. (citing Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co., 23 A. 287, 292 Chancery 1891)).

90

Brooks, 308 F.Supp at 814 (citing Laredef Corp. v. Fed’l Seaboard Terr Cotta Corp., 25 A.2d 23
433, 437 (Chancery 1942)).
91

Brooks, 308 F.Supp. at 814
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those decisions were taken at the staff level. This trend was to change dramatically with
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC.92

B. The Medical Committee Opinion
The Medical Committee for Human Rights (Medical Committee) obtained by
gift shares in the Dow Chemical Company (Dow).93 On March 11, 1968, the Medical
Committee’s national chairman, Dr. Quentin Young, wrote to Dow and enclosed a first
version of the Medical Committee’s shareholder proposal. The proposal requested the
Board of Directors to amend Dow’s certificate of incorporation to provide “that
napalm94 shall not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurances
that the substance will not be used on or against human beings.”95 In the accompanying
letter, Dr. Young conceded that its primary motivation was the Medical Committee’s
concerns for human life, but he also noted that the Medical Committee’s investment
advisers suggested that napalm production “is also bad for our company’s business as it
is being used in the Vietnamese War” in part because it was making it “increasingly
hard to recruit the highly intelligent well-motivated, young college men so important for
company growth.” In addition, the letter noted that the impact on the company for its
decision to manufacture napalm was global.96
Dr. Young’s language, espousing an economic interest in the corporation was
necessary to overcome language in the Rule that permitted a corporation to exclude a
proposal “if it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted . . . primarily for the
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or other
similar causes.”97 Still, the original proposal was susceptible to exclusion under another
regulation that permitted omission of proposals seeking management action “with
respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the
issuer.”98
92

432 F.2d 659 (D.C.Cir. 1970).
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Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 661.

94

Napalm is an aluminum-based soap which is combined with gasoline to form a syrup used in
chemical warfare. It was developed by Harvard University scientists during World War II in order to
increase the range of flame throwers while also greatly increasing the temperature at which the fuel is
such flame throwers burned. Id. at 661, n. 1.
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Id. at 662.
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Id.
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Id. at 676 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2)).
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Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 676 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5)).
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The Medical Committee had submitted the 1968 version of its proposal after the
deadline for submitting such proposals and Dow, not surprisingly, refused to include it
in its proxy statement.99 In January 1969, having received no further communications
from Dow, the Medical Committee re-submitted its proposal.100 After Dow notified
the Medical Committee that it intended to omit the proposal from its proxy statement,
the Medical Committee sought to revise the proposal.
Acknowledging that
“management should be allowed to decide to whom and under what circumstances it
will sell its products,” the Medical Committee nonetheless urged that “the company’s
owners have not only the legal power but also the historic and economic obligation to
determine what products their company will manufacture.”101 Accordingly, the Medical
Committee enclosed a revised proposal requesting that the Board “consider the
advisability of adopting a resolution setting forth an amendment to [Dow’s certificate of
incorporation] that the company shall not make napalm.”102
Dow was unmoved by the amendments and sent the SEC a memorandum stating
its reasons for omitting the proposal. The SEC Division of Corporation Finance granted
a no-action letter.103 The Medical Committee duly appealed, but the full Commission
approved the recommendation of its Division of Corporation Finance.104 The Medical
Committee next appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Given the case law since Transamerica, it was not entirely clear that the federal
courts had jurisdiction to review SEC decisions relating to shareholder proposals, or
that such review should occur in the Court of Appeals.105 As the court noted,106 after
the Southern District of New York’s ruling in Peck that a shareholder must exhaust
administrative remedies through appeal to the Commission itself before seeking review

99

Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 662.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 663.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id. at 665 (noting that the most difficult issues in the case arise from Dow’s and the SEC’s
claim that the SEC decision is not a reviewable order under § 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act); id.
at 672 (noting that “the essential question . . . is whether the district court is a more appropriate
forum for adjudication of petitioner’s claim than” the Court of Appeals).
106

Id. at 667, n. 9.
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in a federal court,107 shareholders would have faced quite a procedural conundrum if the
D.C. Circuit had now ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies barred a
shareholder from review in a federal court. However, the D.C. Circuit also recognized
that there was some dicta and some scholarly comment suggesting that no-action letters
in the shareholder proposal context were not reviewable orders.108 Still, after an
extended discussion,109 the D.C. Circuit concluded that the SEC determination was
reviewable110 in the Court of Appeals.111
Having failed to persuade the Court of Appeals that it was without jurisdiction
to review SEC decisions in such matters, the SEC nonetheless argued for a level of
judicial deference to the SEC’s views akin to that accorded to prosecutorial
discretion.112 The court did not feel the need to accord the SEC such deference, in large
part because of evidence of frequent procedural irregularities in the SEC’s internal
review of shareholder proposals.113 The most serious charge, the court noted, was “all
too clearly illustrated by the record in the present case: the lack of articulated bases for
past decisions encourages management to file shotgun objections to a shareholder
proposal, urging every mildly plausible legal argument that inventive counsel can
contrive, in the hope that the Commission will accept one of them.”114 The Court
implied that the effect of SEC “discretion” was to dispose of controversies through
“calculated non-decisions that will eventually cause eager supplicants to give up in
frustration and stop ‘bothering’ the agency.”115 The court then proceeded with a limited
107

See supra, notes 66-67 and accompanying text.

108

See Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 666, n. 5 (citing dictum from Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d
182, 183 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965) and one article from a practitioners’ publication but no holding on point).
Subsequent to the Medical Committee case, two Circuit Courts adopted the position that SEC no-action
letters are not reviewable orders. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d
254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the proper course of action if a shareholder believes that a
corporation has improperly refused to include a proposal is to seek judicial review of the propriety of that
action in a district court); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 645-46 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (dismissing action for
want of jurisdiction and distinguishing Medical Committee on the ground that in that case the
Commission had reviewed and affirmed the staff no-action recommendation and in the current case the
Commission had refused comment on staff action).
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Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 665-72.
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review of the SEC’s determination: “if the Commission was found to have proceeded
on erroneous legal principles, the Commission would be ordered to proceed within the
framework of its own discretionary authority on the indicated correct principles.”116
Although the Court deemed it “obvious to the point of banality to restate” Congress’s
purpose in enacting Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it nonetheless
noted that Congress’s intent was “to give true vitality to the concept of corporate
democracy.”117 That purpose could not possibly be frustrated by a remand to the SEC
to articulate the grounds underlying the grant of its no-action letter.
The court then proceeded to a discussion of the merits of the case. As indicated
above, Dow sought to exclude the Medical Committee’s proposal on two grounds: that
its concerns were essentially political rather than economic and that it related to
ordinary business operations.118 The court conceded that these two limitations on the
corporation’s obligation to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials were
“on their face, consistent with the legislative purpose underlying section 14.”119 The
court deemed it “fair to infer” that Congress would not have desired that proxy
solicitations become a vehicle through which “malcontented shareholders [could] vent
their spleen about irrelevant matters.”120 Congress may well also have anticipated that
“management cannot exercise its specialized talents effectively if corporate investors
assert the power to dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions.”121
Still, in language that indicated a radical shift from earlier case law, the court
acknowledged the risk that the two exclusions could be construed so as to exclude
almost any shareholder proposal on the ground it is either too general or too specific.122
The court found that Dow had attempted to either dash the Medical Committee’s
proposal against the Scylla of generality or to drown it in the Charybdis of specificity
and that the SEC had accepted Dow’s decision to exclude the proposal without even

116

Id. at 675.
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119

Id. at 678.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 679.
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identifying which of these hazards had provided the substantive ground for its
decision.123
With respect to the claim that the Medical Committee’s proposal was “too
specific,” in that it related to Dow’s ordinary business operations and was thus
excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(5), the court remarked that the scope of ordinary
business operations was to be determined based on governing state law.124 However,
Delaware law permits amendments to a corporation’s certificate of incorporation so as
to “change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of the” corporation’s business.125
The court found no evidence in the record to support Dow’s contention that the proposal
was not for a proper purpose under Delaware law.126 Departing from the reasoning of
the Brooks court,127 the Medical Committee court criticized the SEC for its “superficial
analysis” of applicable state law and found that the SEC had failed to comply with its
own requirement that management sustain the burden of proof when seeking to omit a
shareholder proposal.128
The court characterized as “somewhat more substantial” Dow’s argument that
the proposal could be excluded as “too general” under Rule 14a-8(c)(2), which
permitted exclusion of proposals that are primarily political in nature.129 However, the
court was unpersuaded by the Dow’s memorandum of counsel on the subject, which
simply described the sorts of political protests of which Dow had been a target because
of its government contracting in connection with the Viet Nam War and then reached
the “abrupt conclusion” that the proposal should therefore be excluded.130 The court
was unwilling to connect the dots and to treat the proposal as representing nothing more
than another example of protest tactics relating to Dow’s contracts with the Department
of Defense.
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See id. (stating that the SEC “made no attempt to choose between” the two “potentially conflicting
arguments” and, relying on Dow’s stated reasons, accepted Dow’s decision to omit the proposals).
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Here again, the court returned to Congress’s intentions in passing § 14(a) of the
’34 Act, whose “overriding purpose” it was “to assure to corporate shareholders their
right – some would say their duty – to control the important decisions which affect them
in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the corporation.”131 In light of this
congressional purpose, the court could find no reason why management should be
permitted to “place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to present to their coowners . . . the question of whether they wish to have their assets used in a manner
which they believe to be more socially responsible but possibly less profitable than that
which is dictated by present company policy.”132 Moreover, in this case, there was
ample evidence that Dow’s management was itself motivated by a political purpose and
not by the profit motive. According to the court, Dow’s own publications proclaimed:
that the decision to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm was
made not because of business considerations, but in spite of them; that
management in essence decided to pursue a course of activity which
generated little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired the
company’s public relations and recruitment activities because
management considered this action morally and politically desirable. . . .
We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction between
management’s legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in
matters of day-to-day business judgment and management’s patently
illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with their vast
resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or moral
predilections. It could scarcely be argued that management is more
qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the
shareholders who are the true beneficial owners of the corporation.133
Not only did the court think that the corporation had not born its burden under the
SEC’s regulations, it also asserted that the regulations – at least as applied in this case –
could not be harmonized with Congress’s intent in adopting § 14(a) of the ’34 Act.134
The case was remanded to the SEC for reconsideration in light of the court’s
opinion and with instructions that the basis for the SEC’s decision must appear in the
record “not in conclusory terms but in sufficient detail to permit prompt and effective
review.”135 The SEC was sufficiently concerned about the consequences of the decision
131

Id. at 680-81.

132

Id. at 681.
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to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.136 However, before the
Court could decide the case, Dow included the proposal in its annual proxy materials,
and it received votes from less than 3% of the shares that participated.137 The Supreme
Court reasoned that, given this meager support for the proposal, Dow may decide to
include it if it were re-submitted in the future rather than litigate.138 The facts thus no
longer presented an active case or controversy, and the case was dismissed as moot.139
The status of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was thus unclear.

C. The Effect of Medical Committee
In the aftermath of Medical Committee, the number of shareholder proposals
increased dramatically, as did the number of proposals relating to social issues.140 In
addition, the SEC for the first time revised the Rule in a way that restricted the ability of
management to exclude such proposals from its proxy materials. In 1972, the SEC
revised the portion of the Rule relating to the exclusion of social proposals, permitting
the exclusion of proposals only if they were not “significantly related to the issuer’s
business or within its control.”141 In 1976, the SEC again revised the Rule, eliminating
all reference to social or political proposals.142
As we shall see, the Medical Committee opinion influenced Peter Lovenheim to
become a shareholder activist. He was not alone. Between 1976 and 1983, social
proposals accounted for over 20% of all proposals received each year by the American
136

SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 401 U.S. 973 (1971)
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SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 405-06 (1972).
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Id. at 406.
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Id. at 407.
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Estimates range on the number of social proposals offered during this period, but there is no doubt
that there was a significant increase. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder
Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425, 431 (1984) (stating that the number of social proposals increased
from six in 1972 to 322 in 1976); Schwartz & Weiss, Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule,
65 GEO. L. J. at 637, n. 11 (stating that there were 133 social proposals raised in 88 separate shareholder
meetings in 1976, both of which were record highs). Liebeler provides a statistical breakdown on
shareholder proposals between 1975-76 and 1982-83. During that period, social proposals accounted for
a high of 46.3% of all proposals in 1975-76 and reached their numerical peak in 1980-81, when 372 were
offered. Liebeler, A Proposal, 18 GA. L. REV. at 467. Rates at which proposals were excluded pursuant
to SEC no-action letters also peaked in 1975-76, when 38.5% of all proposals were excluded. Id.
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Solicitations of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178-79 (Oct. 31, 1972)

See Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 911 (stating that the number of
social and political proposals “exploded” after the 1976 reforms).

The Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands

23

Society of Corporate Secretaries.143 However, after a 1983 revision of the Rule that
required a proponent to own $1000 worth of stock in the issuer, the number of social
proposals dropped by more than half.144

II. FAIR IS FOWL: THE STORY OF LOVENHEIM V. IROQUOIS
BRANDS
Peter Lovenheim was something of an amateur investor. When he found out
about a company that he liked, he would buy shares. In the fall of 1981, he bought 200
shares of the common stock of Iroquois145 on the advice of his fiancée, who was a
nutritionist,146 and had recommended the Schiff line of vitamins that Iroquois
distributed.147 Lovenheim also saw potential for Iroquois’ stock “because of its
involvement in the expanding market for health foods and natural foods.”148 Within a
few months of purchasing his Iroquois stock, Lovenheim received proxy materials from
which he learned that Iroquois marketed Eduard Artnzer pâté de foie gras, in the United
States.149 Foie gras is a gourmet food produced from the livers of domesticated geese
raised on a carbohydrate-rich diet.150

A.

What’s Good for the
Shareholder Proposal

Goose:

Lovenheim’s

First

Lovenheim had originally been attracted to Iroquois because the corporation
marketed products that promoted healthy lifestyles.151 He did not think that
143

Liebeler, A Proposal, 18 GA. L. REV. at 467.
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See Bruce Ingersoll, Annual Meetings Are Much Calmer Affairs under Changed SEC Shareholder
Rules, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 1985) (“The number of shareholder resolutions filed on social and ethical
issues fell from 215 in 1983 to 93 [in 1984] and 83 [in 1985]”).
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Affidavit of Peter C. Lovenheim, at 1, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F.Supp. 554 (D.C.
Dist. 1985) [hereinafter Lovenheim Aff.].
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See PETER C. LOVENHEIM, PORTRAIT OF A BURGER AS A YOUNG CALF: THE TRUE STORY OF ONE
MAN, TWO COWS AND THE FEEDING OF A NATION 64 (2002) (describing his wife as a nutritionist).
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encouraging the consumption of pâté de foie gras was consistent with the rest of
Iroquois’ product lines, nor did he think that other like-minded shareholders would want
Iroquois to be involved in the distribution of pâté de foie gras if the production of the
product involved significant animal cruelty.152 Although Lovenheim was working at the
Humane Society at the time of the lawsuit153 and was described in the press as “an
animal rights activist,”154 he would later describe himself as someone who did some
work for the Humane Society when he was just out of school but was not “an animal
rights person.”155 Lovenheim was not a strict vegetarian.156
The corporation’s view of itself was very different from the way Lovenheim
understood it. Although it did market natural foods and vitamins as two of its product
lines, those product lines were by no means central to the corporation’s mission or
identity. Iroquois started out as a brewery and, at the time Lovenheim invested,
distributed many diverse product lines, ranging from Champale to Yoohoo, through
numerous subsidiaries.157
According to Lovenheim, the process of force-feeding usually begins when the
birds are four months old. At farms at which the process has been mechanized, the
birds are placed in a metal brace and the neck is stretched so that a funnel may be
inserted 10-12 inches down the bird’s throat. 400 grams of corn mash are then pumped
into the birds’ stomachs, while an elastic band around its neck prevents regurgitation.
152
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See Tischler, Animal Law, 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y at 40.
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See Jerry Knight, Force- Feeding Moral Issues onto Corporate Agendas, WASH. POST (Mar. 11,
1985) at Washington Business, 1 (referring to the case as a “landmark lawsuit” brought by “an animal
rights activist”).
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See LOVENHEIM, PORTRAIT OF A BURGER, at 192 (expressing concern, as he was preparing to visit
a slaughterhouse that he might be denied entry because of the company’s suspicions as to his motives).
Lovenheim never wanted to become a one-issue person. He had worked as a freelance journalist during
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interests of journalists in freedom of information. Having worked on that issue for a short time, and
having written a couple of pieces of journalism that related to animal law, Lovenheim then moved to a
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Where the process is done by hand, the feeder uses a funnel and a stick to force the
mash down the bird’s throat.158 The birds are force fed for between 15 and 28 days, and
shortly thereafter they are slaughtered.159 During the brief period of force-feeding, the
geese double their weight, but their livers swell until they account for up to ten percent
of the bird’s total weight. An ordinary goose liver weighs about 120 grams; the liver of
a force-fed bird weighs between 800 and 1000 grams.160 Up to 10% of the birds die
before they can be slaughtered as a result of the forced feeding.161
On May 10, 1982, Lovenheim wrote to Iroquois’ management and requested
that it look into the possibility that the pâté product that it was distributing was
produced through forced-feeding of geese.162 The corporation did not respond to that
letter or to subsequent communications,163 so on December 14, 1982, Lovenheim, on
his own behalf and on behalf of the Humane Society, wrote a letter to Terence J. Fox,
the president of Iroquois, enclosing a shareholder proposal for inclusion in the
company’s proxy materials for action at the next Iroquois annual shareholder meeting to
be held in May 1983.164 The letter stated that the proposal was prepared in accordance
with the relevant regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.165 Lovenheim also notified the corporation that he intended to attend the
annual shareholder meeting.166
Under the regulations operative at the time, Lovenheim was eligible to submit a
proposal based on his ownership of 200 shares of stock in the corporation for at least
one year prior to the shareholder meeting.167 Lovenheim’s proposal noted that Iroquois
“strives to maintain a reputation as a distributor of wholesome foods” and characterized
158

Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, 618 F.Supp. 554, 556, n.2 (D.C. Dist. 1985) (citing Affidavit of
Peter Lovenheim).
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Transcript, Annual Meeting of Stockholders of Iroquois Brands Ltd., May 10, 1983, 12
[hereinafter 1983 Annual Meeting Transcript] (on file with the author).
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Peter C. Lovenhein, Letter to Terrence J. Fox, dated December 14, 1982 (on file with the author).
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the proposal as seeking “to assure that Iroquois Brands, Ltd. is not inadvertently
promoting cruelty to animals and does not risk damaging its reputation as a distributor
of wholesome foods.”168 The proposal then asked the corporation to:
form a committee to study the methods by which its French supplier
produces pâté de foie gras, and report to the shareholders its findings and
opinions, based on expert consultation, on whether this production
method causes undue distress, pain or suffering to the animals involved
and, if so, whether further distribution of this product should be
discontinued until a more humane production method is developed.169
The proposal indicates how, notwithstanding Medical Committee, shareholders still had
to steer between the Scylla of generality and the Charybdis of specificity.
Presumably, Lovenheim knew or suspected that pâté de foie gras is always
produced through the force-feeding of geese, and he really wanted Iroquois to stop
distributing the product because its distribution encouraged what he considered a form
of animal cruelty. But under the SEC rules operative at the time, shareholders could not
bring proposals relating to the continuation of a particular product, as control over
ordinary business operations was entrusted to management alone.170 Nor could
Lovenheim bring a proposal that simply denounced animal cruelty and demanded that
Iroquois adopt a position consistent with his ethical objections to inhumane treatment of
animals without running afoul of the SEC regulation intended to prevent the shareholder
proposal from being abused as a mechanism of general political protest.171 As a result,
the shareholder proposal has a bit of absurdist theater about it. Proposals must ask the
board to form a committee to investigate a matter and make recommendations.172 That
168

Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be held on May 10, 1983, Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 18
(hereinafter 1983 Notice of Annual Meeting) (on file with the author).
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Id.; see also Lovenheim, 618 F.Supp. at 556.
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See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2)(1982).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5)(1982).
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Proposals calling for the formation of a committee of investigation have become the norm when
shareholders offer social proposals. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. WalMart Stores, Inc. 821 F.Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing the excludability of a proposal
requesting that Wal-Mart’s directors prepare and distribute reports relating to the company’s equal
opportunity hiring and procurement policies); New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. Dole,
Food Co., Inc., 795 F.Supp. 95, 96, (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing the excludability of a proposal
requesting the Board of Directors to establish a committee for the purpose of evaluating the impact of
proposals for health care reform and their impact on the company); Austin v. Consolidated Edison Co., of
New York, Inc., 785 F.Supp. 192, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing the excludability of a proposal
requesting that shareholders adopt a non-binding resolution endorsing the idea that the corporation’s
employees should be allowed to retire after 30 years of service, regardless of age).
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way, the shareholder does not interfere with the conduct of ordinary business
operations, as the final decision is left in the discretion of the board.
The corporation responded with a letter from Iroquois’ General Counsel
requesting certification of the number of shares owned by Mr. Lovenheim and the
Humane Society.173 Lovenheim got back to Iroquois just five days later, providing
certification of the shares owned by the Humane Society. As the SEC regulations did
not require him to state the quantity of shares owned by a person bringing a shareholder
proposal, Lovenheim pointed out that he did not need to provide the certification
requested, but he did state that he had owned 200 shares Iroquois common stock since
1981.174
The corporation had no further objection to Lovenheim’s proposal. It included
the proposal in the proxy materials distributed in advance of its May 1983 shareholder
meeting.175 It also included its own recommendation that shareholders vote against
Lovenheim’s proposal. While noting that the corporation “deplores cruelty to animals
in any form and commends the Humane Society of the United States for the important
work it does to alleviate such practices,”176 management gave the following reasons for
its opposition: (1) Iroquois exercised no control over the production of the French pâté;
(2) the product is tested and approved by the Federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA); (3) it is unnecessary to form a panel of directors to study an issue over which
the board has no control; and (4) the product in question “represents an infinitely small
percent of Iroquois’ sale and profits” – in fact the expert consultation called for in the
proposal would entail costs in excess of the expected profitability of the product.177
As he stated he would, Lovenheim appeared at that annual shareholder meeting
and presented his proposal.178 In his presentation, Lovenheim offered a point-by-point
refutation of management’s arguments. He pointed out that FDA regulation does not
encompass any test for humane treatment. “You can import brains pulled from the
skulls of live dogs, and the FDA would accept it for importation,” Lovenheim noted.179
Lovenheim next noted that it simply was not true that Iroquois had no control over the
173
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174

Peter C. Lovenheim, Letter to Ralph L. Halpern, dated January 11, 1983 (on file with the author).
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production of the product, since consumers can always pressure producers to change
their production processes.180 Lovenheim also addressed management’s concerns about
the cost of expert consultation on the matter by pointing out that the experts in question
would likely be academics, who do not charge much for their services. If the charges
proved excessive, Lovenheim offered, the Humane Society would provide expert
consultations at no cost.181 Finally, Lovenheim urged shareholders’ to reject
management’s position that humane treatment of animals was simply too costly. “I say
that if an investigation would cost too much, then we should stop selling the product, or
if we are to continue selling the product, then we should have the investigation.”182
Another shareholder then rose in support of Lovenheim’s proposal.183 In the ensuing
vote, Lovenheim’s proposal garnered 50,000 votes, just over 5% of those cast.184

B.

The Goose Chase: From Proponent to Litigant

Encouraged by this result, Lovenheim offered the same resolution the following
year.185 He wrote well in advance to seek information regarding the date for the
upcoming shareholder meeting.186 To Lovenheim’s surprise, the company responded
this time by notifying him (through corporate counsel) that Iroquois considered the
proposal excludable.187 During the intervening year, the SEC had again revised its
regulations.188
180
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See id. at 18 “[I]t seems to me since it is such a cruel way to obtain [liver pâté], it would be a
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Memorandum of Law, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of
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Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20,091 (Aug. 23, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (1983).
The story behind this revision was been told in some detail in scholarship published not long after its
adoption. See Cane, Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System, 11 J. CORP. L. at 62-67
(characterizing the SEC’s motivation in formulating the revisions as proposing a total reexamination of
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The SEC now required shareholders to own at least one percent or $1000 worth
of the corporation’s stock for at least one year prior to the submission of the proposal.189
In addition, the rules now permitted exclusion of proposals relating to business
operations accounting for less than five percent of the issuer’s total assets and for less
than five percent of net earnings and gross sales and not otherwise significantly related
to the issuer's business.190 Thus, when Lovenheim submitted his proposal in 1983,
which was virtually identical to the one submitted one year earlier, Iroquois’ only
response was to copy him on a letter to the SEC, which stated its intention to omit the
proposal from its proxy statement on the ground that it related “to operations which
account for less than 5 percent of [Iroquois’] total assets . . . and less than 5 percent of
its net earnings and gross sales . . . and is not otherwise significantly related to”
Iroquois’ business.191
However, as Lovenheim pointed out in his responsive memorandum of law,
Iroquois thus did nothing more than re-state the purportedly applicable SEC rule.192
Such a simple assertion was not sufficient to meet the corporation’s burden, said
Lovenheim, under the applicable federal regulations.193 In any case, Lovenheim
argued, even if it were true that the product at issue did not constitute five percent of
Iroquois’ assets, earnings or sales, Iroquois could not show that the product was not
“otherwise significantly related” to its business.194 Setting aside the broader social
importance of animal cruelty, Lovenheim argued that, given that Iroquois was a health
food company, whose major product lines included natural vitamins, herb teas and other
natural foods that did not include any animal products in their ingredients, the proposal
was significantly related to Iroquois’ economic interests.195 This was especially so,
the reasons for the rule’s existence) Liebeler, A Proposal, 18 GA. L. REV. at 433-37 (describing the three
approaches considered by the SEC before it adopted the first of those options in the 1983 amendments).
189
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Ralph L. Halpern, Letter to SEC Division of Corporation Finance, dated December 13, 1983,
included as Attachment 4 to the Lovenheim Aff. (on file with the author).
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See Memorandum of Law, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of
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Shareholder Proposal Commission File No. 1-5387, at 4 (Jan 16, 1984) (on file with the author) (“The
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Lovenheim contended, because consumers of health food and natural food products are
more likely to value humane treatment of animals than is the general public.196
Lovenheim cited to Iroquois’ advertisements of its products in magazines such as
Vegetarian Times and Prevention, both of which clearly were marketed towards
audiences concerned about animal cruelty.197
Finally, Lovenheim argued that the SEC, in using the phrase “significantly
related” in the relevant regulation, did not mean to permit corporations to omit
proposals that related to significant social and ethical issues.198 The Commission
recognized that there are many instances in which the matter involved in a proposal is
significant to an issuer’s business, even though such significance is not apparent from
an economic viewpoint.199
Addressing none of the legal arguments and factual claims in Lovenheim’s 20page memorandum, the SEC sided with Iroquois in a two-paragraph no-action letter.200
The SEC simply noted that “[t]here appears to be some basis for your opinion that the
proposal may be omitted from the Company’s proxy material under Rule 14a-8(c)(5)”
and concluded that there would be no enforcement action if the Lovenheim proposal
were omitted from Iroquois’ proxy materials.201
Lovenheim appealed the decision of the Division of Corporation Finance to the
SEC’s five commissioners.202 His memorandum of law submitted to the commissioners
rehearsed the arguments from his earlier memorandum, which it incorporated by
reference203 and made the additional argument that the proposal was not new and had
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won more than five percent of votes cast at the 1983 shareholder meeting.204 The
Commission declined review.205
Lovenheim attempted to settle his differences with the corporation in advance of
the annual shareholder meeting. He offered to drop the shareholder proposal if Iroquois
would simply agree to set up a committee to investigate the methods used for the
manufacture of the pâté distributed by the corporation.206 Lovenheim recommended
that three members of the animal protection community serve as ex officio members of
the committee: one representative from American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, one representative from the Humane Society and Lovenheim himself.207
Iroquois was not receptive to such a settlement.208
Lovenheim was undeterred. In fact, the SEC’s casual, unreflective decision
denying review of his appeal of the SEC staff’s issuance of a no-action letter infuriated
and inspired him.209 He prepared his shareholder proposal for a third time. On October
17, 1984, he sent the proposal for inclusion in Iroquois’ 1985 proxy statement.210 Once
again, Iroquois responded with a letter to the SEC stating its intention to omit
Lovenheim’s proposal from its proxy materials.211 This time, the corporation took the
trouble to present some statistics, indicating that the pâté at issue accounted for less than
0.05% of the corporation’s sales, less than 0.3% of its net earnings and less than 0.09%
of its assets for 1982 and 1983, statistics not expected to change significantly in 1984.212
204
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On January 9, 1985, The SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance once again issued a
response to Iroquois, stating that it would not recommend any enforcement action if
Iroquois were to omit Lovenheim’s proposal from its proxy materials.213

C.

Iroquois’ Goose Is Cooked in the D.C. District Court

As a relatively recent law graduate, Lovenheim still had a fresh recollection of
Medical Committee.214 In Lovenheim’s view, that decision compelled a ruling in his
case obligating Iroquois to distribute his proposal, because it raised a socially
significant issue that was related to Iroquois’ business. So Lovenheim bypassed an
appeal to the SEC commissioners and filed suit in the D.C. District Court215 seeking an
injunction ordering Iroquois to distribute his proposal.216 This time, he retained
Jonathan Eisenberg, an experienced attorney who agreed to work pro bono and to help
him on the brief submitted in support of his suit for injunctive relief.217 Lovenheim’s
motivation in skipping review by the Commission may have been in the interests of
saving time and resources. It also may have been strategic, since at oral argument in the
District Court, his counsel argued that the court owed no deference to a decision by the
SEC’s staff to issue a no-action letter.218 It may well have proved harder to persuade
the court that it owed no deference to the SEC’s Commissioners’ interpretation of the
agency’s own rules.
Jonathan Eisenberg acknowledged during oral argument that Lovenheim did not
bring the proposal because he expected it to win a majority of the shareholder vote.219
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Rather, the purpose was to “force management to take a hard look at the conduct they
are engaged in” and to “ask themselves whether they can defend that” conduct.220
Eisenberg contended that the effectiveness of this tactic was evidenced by the fact that
in 1982 32 shareholder proposals had been withdrawn as moot, suggesting that the
corporations chose to adopt the measures proposed rather than put them to a shareholder
vote.221 Eisenberg reminded the court that the proposal had won five percent of the
shareholder vote when it had been included in Iroquois’ 1983 proxy materials and stated
that if the proposal were again included, he believed there to be “a significant chance”
that Iroquois would decide to discontinue distribution of the product.222
On the law, Eisenberg encouraged the court to consider the relevant regulation,
14a-8(c)(5), as constituting a two-part test, both of which have to be met for the
corporation to be permitted to exclude a proposal.223 Lovenheim did not challenge
Iroquois’ claim that the economic portion of 14a-8(c)(5) was met,224 but Eisenberg
stressed that in 1976 the SEC re-wrote the regulation, removing language that permitted
the corporation to omit a proposal “if it is submitted primarily for general political,
social ends” and adding language permitting omission of proposals that are not
economically significant and “that are not significantly related to the issuer’s
business.”225
The effect of the change was, in Eisenberg’s view, to eliminate from the SEC’s
regulation any indication that social proposals “were suspect.”226 Since the 1976
changes, the SEC had required that all social proposals be included so long as the
issuer’s business was in any way implicated in the proposal.227 Eisenberg’s argument
220
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Id. at 6. But see Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8, 30 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL L. REV. at 21-22 (arguing that it is
extremely unlikely that corporate management would change policies in response to shareholder
proposals that are resoundingly defeated).
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suggests that the SEC learned from Medical Committee and sought to avoid a head-on
collision with the judiciary over whether or not it could permit exclusion of social
proposals without undermining Congress’s intent in passing Section 14(a) of the ’34
Act.228
The requirement that the proposal be significantly related was met here,
Eisenberg contended, because Iroquois made $70,000 worth of sales in pâté de foie
gras.229 If the issue was significant and the corporation were doing even “one
completely outrageous thing a year,” Eisenberg maintained, the corporation could not
refuse to include a proposal relating to that conduct on the ground that it was not
“economically significant,” in that the conduct did not relate to five percent of the
corporation’s assets.230
Counsel for Iroquois stressed that the connection between the issue raised by the
proposal and Iroquois’ business was “de minimis,” and that the SEC could not possibly
have intended to require corporations to include in proxy statements every single social
proposal that had any conceivable connection to the corporation’s operations.231 Pâté de
foie gras accounted for only a tiny portion of Iroquois’ business. According to the
affidavit of its president, Iroquois had annual revenues of $141 million, $6 million in
annual profits and $78 million in assets. Its sales of pâté amounted to just $79,000,
resulting in a net loss of $3,121. The company valued its total assets related to pâté at
$34,000.232 Accordingly, Iroquois thought it was well within its rights under the
relevant SEC rule to deny Lovenheim’s request.
Iroquois argued, in essence, that the main point of 14a-8(c)(5) was to make
certain that proposals relate to significant portions of the issuer’s business, even if they
raise significant political, social or ethical issues.233 Corporations are business entities.
They and the SEC are primarily interested in economic matters, Iroquois argued, with
respect to proxy statements as in all other areas.234 Medical Committee, as Iroquois
228
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understood it, stood only for the proposition that a corporation may not exclude a
proposal simply on the ground that it raises political issues. The opinion did not require
the inclusion of proposals that are of no real economic significance to the
corporation.235
The court sided with Lovenheim on the decisive point. Although Medical
Committee was decided under an earlier version of the Rule and the economic
significance of Dow’s production of napalm was not an issue in the case, the court
noted that the D.C. Circuit, in deciding Medical Committee, had assumed that “napalm
was not economically significant to Dow.”236 After a brief review of the Rule, the court
concluded that there was simply no evidence that the SEC intended to limit its
understanding of the “significance” of a proposal to economic criteria, as Iroquois
suggested it should.237 The court recognized the social significance of Lovenheim’s
proposal and the fact that it “implicate[d] significant levels of sales” for Iroquois.238 It
therefore granted Lovenheim the injunctive relief he sought.239
The court’s factual findings were significant. The evidence cited in the opinion
for the social significance for Lovenheim’s proposal was limited to a footnote making
reference to Lovenheim’s brief.240 Lovenheim had argued that humane treatment of
animals is a “foundation of western culture.” In support of this argument, he cited the
Seven Laws of Noah,241 as well as animal protection statutes beginning with one
enacted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641. By the time of the litigation, such
statutes had been enacted in all fifty states.242
A court might have considered such evidence as strikingly weak, as none of it
specifically addressed a state interest in regulating the force-feeding of geese.243 At the
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time the case was decided, Lovenheim could not have cited to a single federal, state or
locality that had attempted to regulate the force-feeding of geese.244 Indeed, at oral
argument, Iroquois’ counsel made the policy argument that corporations should not
have to decide “which issues are sufficiently important to be put to the shareholders on
philosophical and ethical terms and which issues are not.”245 Iroquois’ counsel
obviously thought that the issue of force-feeding of geese in France was not
significant,246 a view apparently shared by “proxy resolution afficianados.”247 Even
Lovenheim’s counsel came very close to conceding that the issue was not as significant
as the use of napalm raised in Medical Committee.248 Neither party offered expert
testimony on the political social or ethical significance of the issue. One is hard pressed
to imagine where such expertise would reside or why it should reside in a corporation,
in the SEC or in a court. 249 Determining which issues are “important” is not within the
institutional competence of any of those bodies.250
Leaving significance aside, there was also the question of what constitutes
“significantly related” to the business operations of the issuer. Lovenheim’s counsel
offered that a proposal advocating that the corporation cease doing business in South
244

The first such regulation was introduced in California in 2004. Under the new law, as of July 1,
2012, “a product may not be sold in California if it is the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of
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Foie Gras, They Declare, CHIC. TRIB. (Dec. 21, 2006), at C1 (suggesting the the city’s Department of
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Chicago’s Wild Foie Gras Chase, CHIC. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2006), at C1 (reporting brisk sales of foie gras
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The ban was officially lifted in May 2008. Dan Mihalopoulos & Mark Caro, Daley Special: Foie gras
back on the menu, CHIC. TRIB. (May 15, 2008), at A1.
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See Cane, Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System, 11 J. CORP. L. at 61 (noting the
notoriety of Lovenheim’s proposal).
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Comparing the Lovenheim case to Medical Committee, Eisenberg said, “We think that although
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See Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 905-06 (“Rule 14a-8’s ‘proper
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Africa would be excludable if the corporation did not in fact do business there and that a
proposal like Lovenheim’s would not have to be submitted to the shareholders of IBM
if IBM did not import pâté de foie gras.251 But Iroquois counsel countered that “clever
and imaginative lawyers will always be able to think of some tenuous link to the
business of the corporation.”252 A shareholder might argue that there is a significant
relation between IBM’s business operations and pâté de foie gras if it offers the delicacy
for purchase in its employee cafeteria once a month.253 In Eisenberg’s response, he
simply pointed out that there had as yet arisen no problem with IBM shareholders using
proposals to object to the items on the menu in the employee cafeteria.254
Nor is the basis clear for the court’s finding that sales of pâté de foie gras
“implicated significant levels of sales” for Iroquois Brands. The court had earlier noted
that, because sales of pâté de foie gras accounted for only $34,000 of the company’s
assets, and that sales of pâté de foie gras had resulted in a net loss, the proposal
implicated “none of the company’s net earnings and less than 0.05% of its assets.”255 In
a footnote, the court noted that the result in the case would have been different if the
proposal had no “meaningful relationship to the business of” the corporation.256 Still,
the court’s willingness to accept as socially significant any proposal relating to a subject
about which some national non-profit organizations had expressed concern, coupled
with its willingness to think it significantly related to a business if it accounts for 0.05%
of a corporations’ assets, suggested that corporations could be obligated to distribute
shareholder proposals on nearly any subject that in any way related to their businesses.
There was a great deal of media interest in the case, with articles appearing in
The Washington Post,257 The Los Angeles Times,258 and The Wall Street Journal,259
251
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Philip Smith, Shareholders to Be Given Pâté Question, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 1985), at E3; Jerry
Knight, Force- Feeding Moral Issues onto Corporate Agendas, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 1985) at
Washington Business, 1.
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4, 2.
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among other newspapers.260 The Washington Post was especially vocal in its support
for Lovenheim’s brand of shareholder activism: “There isn’t a company in the country
that couldn’t benefit from 10 tough questions from stockholders at its annual meeting
this year. But there probably isn’t one company in 10 that will face them.”261 Given
the timing of the opinion, Iroquois had to acquiesce, as there was insufficient time to
appeal the decision before the next annual shareholder meeting,262 which was held just
weeks after the District Court’s decision.263
Lovenheim attended the meeting, as required under the regulations, and he
presented his proposal to the shareholders and their proxies. The reception was far from
warm.264 Lovenheim’s proposal received less than eight percent of the votes cast by
Iroquois’ shareholders.265 As a result, Iroquois would not be required to include
Lovenheim’s proposal or another proposal on the same subject matter for three years.266
Despite the court victory and the publicity, ordinary shareholders were unmoved.267 Or
were they? Within months of the shareholder meeting, Iroquois sold the unit
responsible for importing pâté de foie gras, announcing that it now considered the issue
put behind the company.268
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Timothy Bannon, Where’s the Liver? UNITED PR. INT’L (Mar. 2, 1985).
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Lovenheim comes on the tail end of a period in the history of shareholder
proposals when individual shareholders were the dominant shareholder activists.269 In
the 1980s, institutional investors, first church groups and then pension funds, began to
play a leading role in promulgating shareholder proposals.270 Lovenheim is a
paradigmatic transitional case because, although Peter Lovenheim brought his proposal
in his own behalf, he also did so on behalf of the Humane Society of the United
States.271 Moreover, Lovenheim worked closely with organizations opposed to animal
cruelty in attempting to use his shareholder proposal as part of a broader strategy to
persuade Iroquois to stop marketing pâté de foie gras. His case suggests the difficulties
an individual investor might face in trying to put pressure on a corporation through the
mechanism of the shareholder proposal and thus illustrates why the transition from
individual shareholder activists to institutional activism might have occurred.

D.

Lovenheim’s Further Adventures in Animal Law

After his experience with Iroquois, Lovenheim, having returned to his native
Rochester, began offering his services as a sort of freelance drafter of shareholder
proposals for non-profit organizations.272 He worked with People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA), and helped them start an ongoing program aimed at
bringing animal protection issues to the attention of corporations through shareholder
proposals.273 Lovenheim also teamed up with Henry Spira, a brilliant tactician in the art
of “constructive shaming,” which involves pressuring corporations into cooperating
269

See Gillan & Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. at 56
(providing a short history of shareholder activism and noting that the eclipse of individual investors as the
proponents of shareholder proposals began in the mid-1980s).
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See Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy,
23 GA. L. REV. 7, 157-59 (1988) (reporting that institutional investors targeted around 50 corporations for
shareholder proposals in 1987). Church sponsored proposals accounted for 10.97% of all shareholder
proposals in the 1979-80 proxy season and 14.02% of such proposals in 1982-83. Liebeler, A Proposal,
18 GA. L. REV. at 468. In the 21st century, pension funds such as the California Public Employee
Retirement System (CalPERS) have taken a leading role in the shareholder proposal movement. In
2007, CalPERS alone filed 33 shareholder proposals. CalPERS Steps up Pace of Shareholder Activism,
CalPERS Press Release (Aug. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2007/aug/steps-up-shareowner-activism.xml (last
visited Aug. 23. 2009). Recently hedge funds have assumed a new prominence among proponents. See
Gillian & Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., at 68 (describing hedge
funds as a dominant force in the shareholder activism arena).
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with advocates for the ethical treatment of animals.274 Spira’s biographer, Peter Singer,
describes him as follows:
Henry Spira [was] a bushy-haired New York high school teacher who
spoke with a broad accent that came from years spent on ships as a sailor
in the merchant marine and on the General Motors assembly line in New
Jersey. [Revlon’s vice president for investor relations, Roger] Shelley
saw that Henry’s clothes were crumpled, that he rarely wore a tie, and
that when he did, he seemed incapable of getting it to meet his collar.
But that wasn’t all that Shelley noticed: “There was not one ounce of
product on his body that was produced by an animal and that included
his belt, that included shoes, that included everything . . . Here was a
man who did what he said he would do.”275
Singer chronicles Spira’s career as an advocate for animals. From 1975-77, Spira
organized a campaign to end animal experimentation at New York’s Museum of
Natural History.276 Spira and his colleagues not only highlighted the suffering of the
animals that were the subject of the experiments277 in the museum, they were also able
to show that the research was more or less useless.278 The museum closed and
dismantled its laboratories.279
Spira next pressured Amnesty International into ceasing its support for a group
of scientists that was torturing pigs in order to learn whether torture could be conducted
without leaving visible traces.280 There followed a successful campaign to repeal New
York’s Metcalf-Hatch Act, which allowed medical researchers to seize unclaimed dogs
and cats from animal shelters.281 Spira then launched a series of campaigns against
274

See generally PETER SINGER, ETHICS INTO ACTION: HENRY SPIRA AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1998).
275

Id. at x.
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Id. at 54-74.

277

See id. at 66 (describing experiments on cats involving deafening, blinding, destruction of the
sense of smell, removal of brain parts, severing of nerves in the penis and castration).
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See id. at 67 (reporting that Science staff writer Nicholas Wade discovered that 14 of the 21
scientific papers produced by the researchers had never been cited and the others were cited infrequently).
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Id. at 71.

280

See id. at 75-77 (describing Spira’s victory in a short, cerebral campaign, which Spira celebrated
by becoming a member of Amnesty International).
281

Id. at 78-83.
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corporations engaged in inhumane treatment of animals, including: a largely successful
campaign to get Revlon to develop new ways to test eye irritancy and thus to stop
blinding rabbits in order to test the safety of its products;282 a campaign that greatly
reduced the use of a brutal product safety process, LD50, which involves determining
the dose at which a substance is lethal to 50% of the animals tested;283 and a far less
successful effort to expose inhumane treatment of chickens by the Perdue Farms
corporation.284
Spira next teamed up with Temple Grandin, a designer of livestock handling
facilities and a Professor of Animal Science at Colorado State University, to replace the
“shackle and hoist” method for the ritual slaughter of cattle with a more humane upright
restraining system that Grandin designed.285 There followed an equally successful
campaign to end the USDA’s policy of face-branding Mexican cattle.286 Aiming at a
larger impact on the farm animal industry, Spira next targeted McDonald’s.287 While
Spira’s usual strategy was to take out full-page ads in major newspapers illustrating
animal cruelty and thus to use the threat of adverse publicity to bring corporations to the
table, with Lovenheim’s assistance, he supplemented that tactic with a shareholder
proposal, calling on McDonald’s to form a committee to investigate the effect of factory
farming on animals used in McDonald’s food products.288
Together, Lovenheim and Spira were able to persuade McDonald’s to adopt
three basic principles to help assure humane treatment of the animals used in
McDonald’s products.289 In the several years Lovenheim worked with Spira, he claims
they never had to actually bring a proposal to a vote in a shareholder meeting. Spira
had won a reputation for openness to reasonable compromise. He worked with
corporations until they agreed to adopt measures that would enhance their reputations

282
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farming”).
288

Tischler, Animal Law, 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L & POL’Y, at 43.
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for corporate responsibility. The result was almost invariably at least a partial adoption
of the substance of the proposals that Spira and Lovenheim brought.290
Lovenheim’s story thus suggests that shareholder proposals have consequences
that go beyond their effects on the corporation to which the proposal originally relates.
Peter Lovenheim began as an amateur investor, who chose to put a relatively small
amount of money into corporations in which he believed. He then learned that one of
those corporations was engaged in a business practice of which he disapproved and
which he considered inconsistent with the business model that had led him to invest in
the first place. He raised his voice, but both the corporation and the SEC would not
hear his complaints. This response turned Lovenheim into a litigant and, briefly, in to
an activist. He shared his expertise in writing shareholder proposals with others who
shared his political goals. And one thing led to another. For a time at least, Peter
Lovenheim was transformed by his experience as a proponent into someone who
worked with other to promote social change through mechanisms that were not limited
to the shareholder proposal mechanism.

III. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND THE SEPARATION OF
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
Lovenheim and Medical Committee illustrate the determination and resolve
required of any shareholder who wants to get a proposal before the shareholders of a
corporation. In both cases, the proponents of the proposal either represented or had the
strong, active support of an organization. Lovenheim was an attorney who was not
intimidated by the procedural hurdles shareholders face, but he was exceptional. It is in
fact very rare – and it was even more rare at the time of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands –
for disappointed proponents to challenge no-action letters.291 Up until 1990, there were
only 13 reported cases reviewing SEC determinations on shareholder proposals.292 As
the Medical Committee court noted, the SEC’s process for reviewing proposals was far
from transparent and often resulted in corporations being permitted to omit proposals
for reasons that were not effectively communicated to the proponents of those
proposals.293
For opponents of shareholder proposals, the fact that the proponent in Medical
Committee was an organization that promoted social causes and that Lovenheim had
290
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proposal was deemed unworthy or what he can do to cure its defects for subsequent proxy solicitations”).
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close ties with such an organization highlights the problem of shareholder social
proposals. Opponents of shareholder proposals view shareholders primarily as passive
investors seeking an economic return.294 So viewed, their only interest in political or
social issues ought to be with the effect of such issues on the return on their investment
in the corporation. As one critic of the Rule put it: “Stockholder participatory
democracy is a myth; investors do not buy stock in public companies with any serious
expectation of influencing management. The Wall Street Rule is the only practical rule
by which sensible investors are governed. Small investors who do not like management
sell their shares.”295 If the issue is essentially an economic one, say the social proposal
skeptics, then it ought to be left for corporate managers to decide in the exercise of their
business judgment.296 If the issue is not economic, then it has no business being before
any corporate body.
Lovenheim conceded that his proposal was likely to fail and that, even if it
passed it would require only that the corporation form a committee to study the methods
used in the production of pâté de foie gras and to make recommendations for further
distribution of the product in light of its findings.297 The Lovenheim court made clear
that the proposal’s poor prospects for success did not excuse the corporation from its
obligation to distribute the proposal.298 It is hard to imagine why the SEC would have
intended to permit corporate resources to be utilized in such a way. And yet, in the two
decades since Lovenheim was decided, neither Congress nor the SEC has taken action to
reign in social proposals. On the contrary, the SEC routinely cites to Lovenheim in
denying no-action letters to corporations.299 This final section offers an explanation of
why that is the case.

294

Cane, Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System, 11 J. CORP. L. at 61
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The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Proposals

In connection with its 1984 revisions to Rule 14a-8, the SEC circulated a
questionnaire in order to gauge interested parties’ attitudes towards shareholder
proposals. Nearly three of four respondents agreed or strongly agreed that shareholder
proposals are “a waste of management’s time and [the] corporation’s money.”300 Most
respondents did not agree that proposals are an efficient or effective outlet for
concerned shareholders, although the votes were more evenly split on whether the
proposals are an “effective way of keeping management aware of shareholder
concerns.”301
Although corporation counsel tend to regard shareholder proposals as a
nuisance,302 the overall costs associated with such proposals do not seem to be that
significant.303 One scholar estimated the total cost at about $15 million/year as of
1992.304 In 1975-76, AT&T estimated that it spent $112,450 in including five proposals
in its proxy materials, while it spent $41,140 on eleven others that it omitted.305 A 1981
survey of 18 major corporations indicated an average cost of $94,775 per proposal
submitted.306 In the past two years, the SEC has responded to between 300 and 450
requests for no action letters each year.307 Around the time of the Lovenheim case, the
SEC reported that it devoted only 1208 staff hours per year to the review of shareholder
Assistant General Counsel, Corporate Governance Office and Secretary, Denny’s Corporation, 2009 WL
772857, at *13 (March 17, 2009)
300
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“$1700 of good hard cash”).
304

Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 883.

305

Liebeler, A Proposal, 18 GA. L. REV. at 454.
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proposals and requests for no-action letters, a rough equivalent to the time of one fulltime employee.308 And subsequent to that report, the Rule was amended309 to require
that proponents own significant amounts of stock for one year before submitting their
proposal, thus eliminating the danger that proponents with no real interest in the
corporation abuse the shareholder proposal mechanism in order to get their ideas before
millions of investors at the corporation’s expense.310 Even the most determined
opponents of the proposal concede that its costs both to corporations and to the SEC are
not very significant.311
As Lovenheim understood at the outset, shareholder proposals can succeed in
affecting corporate policy even if they do not come close to winning the shareholder
votes necessary for adoption. They thus can be a highly effective way to persuade
corporate management to adopt socially responsible positions. From a policy
perspective, the costs of shareholder proposals to the SEC and to corporations thus
should be balanced against the possible benefits that derive from such proposals. The
best evidence that such benefits exist is that numerous ideas for reform of corporate
management originated in shareholder proposals but have been subsequently adopted
and implemented by management.312 Because proponents benefit corporations and their
fellow shareholders, SEC rules that force corporations to bear the costs of such
proposals make sense. Without them, because proponents of such proposals do not
benefit in a manner that is proportionate to their contribution of time and effort,313
308
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47,423, n.15 (Oct. 14, 1982).
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shareholders would not be adequately incentivized to bring potentially beneficial
proposals.314 Viewed from this perspective, the Wall Street Rule is inefficient.
Proponents with ideas about how to improve corporations are a resource to the
corporation. If their main recourse is to invest elsewhere, the corporation’s resources
are dissipated.
One scholar has characterized the Rule as a tax imposed on corporations that
pays for a useful mechanism of corporate governance.315 Corporations may well regard
this “tax” as cheaper and less onerous than government regulation.316 Shareholder
proposals facilitate communication between a corporation’s management and its owners
in a manner that is more open, clear and specific than any other mechanism for
communication between management and shareholders.

B. The Efficacy of Shareholder Proposals
Justifications for the existence of shareholder proposals relating to social issues
come in two varieties. One variety focuses on the nature of corporations. It views
shareholders not as passive investors but as owners, who have – and should have – an
interest in the social and political impact of a corporation.317 From this perspective,
shareholders have not only a right but a duty to try to influence corporate management
to adopt socially responsible policies. In the years following the Medical Committee
decision, scholars found ample evidence that corporations were adopting policies on
social issues that were either directly or at least apparently stimulated by shareholder
proposals.318
The other variety is Melvin Eisenberg’s safety valve theory; that is, the idea that
shareholder proposals provide a useful safety valve in that they permit shareholders to
raise their concerns before management and their fellow shareholders in a public forum
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See id. (summarizing collective action, free-riding and rational apathy problems that the rule
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Africa; disclosure of affirmative action and equal opportunity employment programs; disclosure of
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in which the corporation’s leadership must provide some sort of response.319 As
indicated above,320 the safety valve comes at relatively low cost to the corporation.321
But both varieties of defenses of the shareholder proposal process ultimately
sound in a theory of the corporation that recognizes that corporations have a role in
society that is too large to be reduced to economics. Even those who continue to
maintain that corporations exist “primarily to earn a profit for [their] shareholders,”322
acknowledge that the law now recognizes “a greatly enlarged social duty and
responsibility of businesses” to care for the “comfort, health and well-being of their
employees.”323 In fact, corporations’ social duty extends well beyond the well-being of
their employees, and there is actually very little support, either in case law or in statutes,
for the notion that corporations exist primarily for the benefit of their shareholders.324
Rather, corporate management is permitted to justify its decisions not only with
reference to shareholder interests, but also with reference to the interests of other
stakeholders, which may include the interests of creditors, employees, customers, the
industry as a whole or even the community at large.325
The case that best illustrates this principle is Shlensky v. Wrigley,326 in which
minority owners in the corporation that owned the Chicago Cubs brought suit alleging
that the corporation’s directors had breached their duty of care by refusing to install
lights at Wrigley Field.327 The shareholders were armed with evidence that the
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introduction of night games would boost attendance at Cubs games, since they could
show that the White Sox drew more fans at night games on days when the Cubs played
day games, but the teams attracted roughly equal crowds when both played day
games.328 The President of the corporation, Philip K. Wrigley,329 offered two reasons
for refusing to install lights: his belief that baseball is a daytime sport; and his concern
about the effect of lights and night baseball on the surrounding neighborhood.330 The
court permitted the corporation to place its commitment to certain ethical or aesthetic
principles (“baseball is a daytime sport”) and to the Wrigleyville neighborhood ahead of
the economic interests of its shareholders.
The law on corporate charitable giving is consistent with this expansive
understanding of the purpose of corporations. Corporations are permitted to make
charitable donations without any sort of requirement that they justify those donations in
economic terms.331 In the landmark case, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, the New
Jersey Supreme Court enthusiastically embraced the principle that corporations must
supplement their wealth maximizing pursuits with a sense of their social and ethical
responsibility to be good corporate citizens.
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals
they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely for
charitable purposes. With the transfer of most of the wealth to corporate
hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they
have been unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic needs. They
have therefore, with justification, turned to corporations to assume the
modern obligations of good citizenship in the same manner as humans
do.332
The court noted that its understanding of the need for corporate social responsibility
was shared by Congress and state legislatures which had enacted statutes to encourage
corporations to make charitable contributions.333 At the time Barlow was decided, 29
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states had passed statutes permitting corporations to make charitable contributions.334
The Model Business Corporations Act recognizes that corporations have the same
power as an individual to do “all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business
and affairs, including without limitation power: . . . to make donations for the public
welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”335
The Rule and the SEC’s permissive approach to social proposals are
understandable in light of the broader doctrine of corporate purposes. Corporations do
not exist primarily to maximize shareholder wealth. Corporations have become
important and powerful legal persons. Social norms, embodied in laws regulating
corporate governance do not condone the sort of amoral conduct that would result if
corporations were to conceive of themselves purely as vehicles for the production of
wealth. Moreover, in exercising their business judgment for the benefit of the
corporations that they manage, corporate officers and directors do not want shareholder
wealth maximization to define their decision-making processes. Enjoying as they do
the benefits of deference to their business decisions that may be influenced by factors
other than wealth-maximization, corporate managers cannot deny shareholders the
ability to contribute to the decision-making process through social proposals.

CONCLUSION
Judging by the few court cases that address social proposals, one could easily
conclude that cases like Lovenheim are akin to nuisance suits that have no on impact
corporate governance because the proposals never win anything approaching a majority
of the shareholder vote. However, the cases themselves do not tell the full story behind
social proposals. While we cannot know for certain whether Peter Lovenheim’s
proposal was the last straw that led Iroquois to discontinue its distribution of pâté de
foie gras, it is clear from his subsequent experiences that social proposals can influence
corporate decision-making processes.
But are social proposals desirable? If U.S. citizens want regulations preventing
the distribution of products that promote inhumane treatment of animals, if they want to
outlaw cluster bombs, if they want universal health care for all citizens or residents, or
if they want all corporations to embrace affirmative action and renounce all forms of
discrimination based on gender, race, religion, national origin, sexual preference or
gender-identity, why is the political process inadequate? Why should corporations foot
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the bill for the dissemination of all proposals relating to social issues of any significance
that also have some sort of relation to the corporation’s business?
As this Article has argued, the answer lies in the purpose of corporations.
Opponents of social proposals tend to view corporations as vehicles for the generation
of wealth, and they view shareholders as passive investors concerned only with
maximizing the return on their investment.336 This view of corporations appears to be
too narrow. Both courts and legislatures permit corporate boards, in managing their
corporations, to consider many factors other than shareholder wealth maximization.
The SEC’s and the courts’ permissive approach to social proposals is thus consistent
with other bodies of law that recognize that, because of the increasingly important role
of corporations as legal persons within our society, there is a general expectation that
corporations will behave responsibly.
While it is difficult to prove that shareholder proposals help them to do so, the
cost to corporations and to society of social proposals is minimal. The best evidence
that their usefulness outweighs the costs associated with social proposals may be the
failure of corporations to mobilize to oppose them. Corporate managers may recognize
the value of exchange with their shareholders on social issues, and they may also
grudgingly appreciate the consciousness-raising effect that social proposals can have.
Iroquois Brands’ leadership may not have thought of itself as a corporation that catered
to people committed to healthy lifestyles. However, because of Peter Lovenheim’s
proposal, it learned that it had a reputation for promoting food choices consistent with
the humane treatment of animals. That information was likely useful to the corporation,
even if the process through which the corporation achieved enlightenment involved
some pain and even some embarrassment.
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